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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.
[Vol. IV.

Practical Freedom," form a lucid, critical, and independent restatement of the Kantian positions on these questions. In fact, I do not know where the student can find a clearer introduction to the study of these problems.

Professor Riehl's style lends itself readily to translation. His sentences are as a rule short and not involved, and Dr. Fairbanks has given a good reproduction. Only one who has tried it knows how difficult and fatiguing (to put it mildly) it is to be ever on guard against German idioms. By their continual coming they weary him, and he succumbs occasionally from sheer desperation or exhaustion. Passing over occasional infelicities, I call attention to two or three cases of poor or mistaken rendering. At the foot of p. 266, the sense is lost or, at least, made obscure by omission; "we shall speak of the spirit of mankind," would not necessarily convey the same idea as "we shall in the future be able to speak also of the spirit of mankind," which the German calls for. On p. 302, das Princip der Begründung der Veränderung, would be better rendered by the general phrase "principle of the rational comprehension of change" than by the specific "principle that every change has its reason." On p. 343, the meaning would be clearer if the sentence, "The process of the metaphysical thinker is not only fortuitous but even inconsequent," read, "The procedure … is not only arbitrary but even inconsistent." A more serious combination of errors is found in three sentences on p. 74, lines 16-26. In the first sentence, by a change in the order, the predicate is asserted of the intelligent habits also, instead of, as in the German, of the non-intelligent only. Then, by writing 'cannot' for 'can' in the next sentence, and omitting a 'but' at the beginning of the third, a series of statements quite different from the original is presented.

J. H. Tufts.
A Critical Account of the Doctrine of Lotze. The Doctrine of Thought. By Henry Jones, M.A., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. New York, Macmillan & Co. 1895—pp. xvi, 375.

We have in this volume one more of the elaborate commentaries which form the peculiar polemical method employed by the English Hegelians against their philosophic adversaries. 'Whom they would destroy, they commentate,' and it is to be hoped that the spirit of Lotze feels duly complimented. To do Professor Jones justice, his motives are very frankly avowed in the Preface. Lotze is a most