race, passes through three stages of development. At the first or unreflective stage, action is impulsive and there is no thought of hedonic consequences; at the second, action is deliberate and in accordance with the eudaemonistic valuation of the pleasure to be expected; at the third, action is determined by an objectively teleological valuation of the End aimed at. If one keeps strictly to the point of view of the second stage, the only thing worth striving for is a balance of pleasure. When the third has been reached, however, one can regard life as worth living, even when the balance is on the side of pain. As a matter of fact, no one does keep exclusively to the point of view of either stage. Both coëxist, and each is justified in its own sphere. In cases of conflict, however, the second should give way to the third.
This article attempts to solve some of the difficulties which arise in a deterministic ethics. I. How can we reconcile the 'you ought' of moral obligation, and the 'you cannot do otherwise' of determinism? The natural, not the transcendental, meaning of obligation is its only true meaning. If the freedom implied in 'you ought' were transcendental, it would do away with obligation altogether. II. Moral obligation, then, is on the phenomenal plane. Its elements are: (1) the form, and (2) the content of the moral law. Now history teaches that the content of the moral law varies, but in the direction of improvement. This 'improvement 'is not discerned by a 'moral sense.' To judge a thing preferable, is to feel interest or pleasure in it. This doctrine that moral ideas are only special manifestations of the general laws of intelligence has two advantages: (1) it takes account of historical differences in moral standards; and (2) it explains the underlying unity of tendency in moral development. The permanent element in morality, the form of the moral law, is represented by the will, as the content is represented by intelligence. But what is will? What is the volition, following the act of intelligent choice between motives, which we have seen to be fully determined? It is nothing but a continuation of that same choice. The volition, like the feeling, is only an aspect of the act of intelligence, which qua intelligent act, is completely determined. III. Supplementary remarks, (1) If the contrary had not been assumed, it would hardly be necessary to say that intelligence can-
