tion offered. 'Freedomism' is said to admit of our accepting "determinism or necessitarianism of any kind we choose in regard to volition, while denying it of the will" (p. 177). This looks like an uncritical adoption of the Kantian position, without a recognition of its implications. Nearly all the arguments advanced are for 'alternative choice,' in the sense of ordinary in determinism. And the arguments, it should be said, are the familiar ones, almost without exception. Dr. Hyslop conceives of Freedom as possibly "existing in all stages of development from pure determinism to absolute freedom" (p. 173), and holds that "the general doctrine and conception of heredity does not hinder us from supposing that freedom itself might be inherited" (p. 187). The latter passage is quoted, not so much as the surprising statement which it certainly is, as because it shows how utterly the author confuses the phenomenal and the noumenal plane in his discussion of the problem,—and this, after having pointed out that very distinction as affording the clue to its solution.
Only two more of the peculiarities of the discussion can be noticed here. Mr. Balfour is confuted at some length as a typical necessitarian (p. 214 ff.). Again, of the deterministic interpretation of the act of a suicide, it is said: "If suicide attests what his character is, why did it not necessitate the act of self-destruction before?" (p. 221.)
The treatment of Responsibility is somewhat unusual,—an 'innovation,' as the author terms it. As here treated, Responsibility necessarily implies 'Velleity'; but it also implies a great deal more, i.e., 'moral development,' in the most general sense. Hence, responsibility varies, while freedom need not do so. After the author's very elaborate and intensely earnest defense of 'Velleity,' as bearing on the question of human responsibility, and his suggestion that it may exist in an indefinite number of degrees,—one is considerably surprised that he should say, regarding freedom and responsibility: "The former may exist perfectly in non-moral and irrational beings, taking the latter to include the insane, imbecile, and certain classes of criminals, while the latter can exist only in moral agents" (p. 229). This is not an inadvertence. A few pages further on, he says: "Responsibility is thus conditioned much more by the range of knowledge, as applied to moral distinctions, than upon merely conative capacity or elective choice" (p. 234). On this ground, apparently, 'retributive punishment' is ruled out. Punishment should have two objects only: 'prevention' and 'correction.' Dr. Hyslop's
