for buildings, machinery, etc., for the purpose of equipping said plants so that it might comply with the terms of its contract, about $300,000." The board had furnished the convicts.
On the 13th day of August, 1901, after the contract had been in force about 20 months, the State officers, constituting the Board of Penitentiary Commissioners, passed a resolution annulling and setting aside the contract and ordering the superintendent of the Penitentiary "to withdraw from said Brick Company all convicts in their employ, and turn them back into the walls of the Penitentiary, subject to the further orders of the board." It was confessed by the demurrer that the Brick Company had fully carried out the contract on its part. The statute under which the board was authorized to make the contract did not give it power to rescind it, and there was no other statute giving it such power. So the action of the board in setting aside the contract and its order directing the superintendent "to withdraw all convicts in the employ of the Brick Company was purely arbitrary.
The Brick Company brought suit against the members of the board, and against the superintendent and the financial agent of the Penitentiary, to have the resolution attempting to set aside the contract declared null and void, and to restrain them from taking any action to prevent the due performance of the contract under the void order, and "particularly from taking from the Arkansas Brick & Manufacturing Company any of the men then engaged in labor therein, and to require the superintendent, McConnell, to proceed with the execution of the contracts and the furnishing of the labor as therein agreed upon."
The appellants (defendants in that case) contended that, in passing the resolution setting aside the contract and making the order directing the superintendent to withdraw the convicts, the board was acting for and representing the State, and that the State was therefore a necessary party. In response to that contention we said: "The power and authority to make a contract is one thing, but the power to abrogate it is quite another thing, and the latter power is, in this government, possessed by neither the State nor any of her citizens. The State can only speak through the legislative department, which is the mouthpiece of the sovereign; and the Legislature can lawfully pass no law
