upon its minutes. These promises were based upon valuable considerations, and did not constitute new contracts but a continuation of the old by an extension of the time of its performance. The labor to be furnished under the promises was to be in performance of the original contract, which could not expire until it was performed in the manner promised. If I am correct in this conclusion, the board is enjoined and restrained by the decree in the McConnell case from in any manner cancelling or annulling the contract as thus extended and "from refusing and failing to execute and carry out" its terms. The board in this case is the same as in that, the membership being different.
I dissented in the McConnell case on the ground that that suit was in effect, a suit against the State, which could not be sued. But the court held differently, and its judgment in that case has passed beyond its control, and become final, and I think should be enforced in this case. The parties have rightly acted upon the faith of it, and should not suffer on account of confidence in the judgment of the court.
