Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/290

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268
Plutarch's Morals

capitulations in the treaty and composition of peace. So powerful and forcible is use and custom in all things, whereof I purpose now to treat; for that there is no bit nor bridle that is able to repress, tame and keep in a talkative tongue, but it is custom that must do the deed and conquer this malady.

First and foremost, therefore, when in company there shall be any question propounded by them that are about thee, frame and use thyself to hold thy tongue and be silent, until thou see that every man else refuseth to speak and make answer: for according to Sophocles:

To counsel and to run a course in race
Have not both twain one end, to haste apace.

No more verily doth a voice and an answer shoot at the same mark that running aimeth at: for there, to wit, in a race, he winneth the prize that getteth to be foremost; but here, if another man have delivered a suflRcient answer, it will be well enough, by praising and approving his speech, to gain the opinion and reputation of a courteous person; if not, then will it not be thought impertinent, neither can envy or hatred come of it, in case a man do gently shew and open that wherein the other was ignorant, and so after a mild and civil manner supply the defect of the former answer: but above all, this regard would be had: That when a question or demand is addressed and directed unto another, we take it not upon ourselves; and so anticipate and prevent his answer; and peradventure, neither in this nor in anything else, is it decent and commendable to offer and put forth ourselves too forward before we be required; and in this case, when another man is asked a question, our own intrusion, with the putting by of him, is not seemly; for we may be thought (in so doing) both to injure and discredit the party demanded, as if he were not able to perform that which was put upon him, and also to reproach the demandant, as though he had little skill and discretion, to ask a thing of him who could not give the same: and that which more is, such malapert boldness and heady hastiness in rash answering, importeth (most of all) exceeding arrogancy and presumption; for it seemeth, that he who taketh the answer out of his mouth of whom the question is demanded, would say thus much in effect: What need have we of him? what can he say unto it? what skill or knowledge hath he? when I am in place, no man ought to ask any other of these matters, but myself only. And yet many times we propose questions unto some, not of any