Page:Plutarch - Moralia, translator Holland, 1911.djvu/362

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Plutarch's Morals

erected thine own. And therefore we ought not to be sparing of praise and honour in the behalf of an enemy, especially when he deserveth the same; for by this means the party that praiseth shall win the greater praise himself; and besides, if it happen again that he blame the said enemy, his accusation shall be the better taken, and carry the more credit, for that he shall be thought not so much to hate the person as disallow and mislike his action.

But the most profitable and goodliest matter of all is this: That he who is accustomed to praise his enemies, and neither to grieve nor envy at their welfare, shall the better abide the prosperity of his friend, and be furthest off from envying his familiars in any good success or honour that by well-doing they have achieved. And is there any other exercise in the world that can bring greater profit unto our souls, or work a better disposition and habit in them, than that which riddeth us of emulation and the humour of envy? For like as in a city wherein there be many things necessary, though otherwise simply evil, after they have once taken sure footing and are by custom established in manner of a law, men shall hardly remove and abolish, although they have been hurt and endamaged thereby; even so enmity, together with hatred and malice, bringeth in envy, jealousy, contentment, and pleasure in the harm of an enemy, remembrance of wrongs received, and offences passed, which it leaveth behind in the soul when itself is gone; over and besides, cunning practices, fraud, guile, deceit, and secret forlayings or ambushes, which seem against our enemies nothing ill at all, nor unjustly used, after they be once settled and have taken root in our hearts, remain there fast, and hardly or unneth are removed; insomuch as if men take not heed how they use them against enemies, they shall be so inured to them that they will be ready afterwards to practise the same with their very friends.

If therefore Pythagoras did well and wisely in acquainting his scholars to forbear cruelty and injustice, even as far as to dumb and brute beasts; whereupon he misliked fowlers, and would request them to let those birds fly again which they had caught; yea, and buy of fishers whole draughts of fishes, and give order unto his disciples to put them alive into the water again, insomuch as he expressly forbade the killing of any tame beast whatsoever; certes, it is much more grave and decent that in quarrels, debates, and contentions among men, an enemy that is of a generous mind, just, true, and nothing treacherous, should