decided to affirm or deny. But, whenever you call upon part of the nation to administer some great institution, the case becomes wholly different. Here all the various and personal views of men can not be represented by a simple Yes or No. A mixed mass of men, like a nation, can only administer by suppressing differences and disregarding convictions. Take some simple instance. Suppose a town of fifty thousand electors should elect a representative to assist in administering some large and complicated institution. Let us observe what happens. It is only possible to represent these fifty thousand people, who will be of many different mental kinds and conditions, by some principle which readily commands their assent. It will probably be some principle which, from its connection with other matters, is already familiar to their mind—made familiar by preceding controversies. For example, the electors may be well represented on such questions as "Shall the institution be open or closed on Sundays? shall it be open to women? shall the people be obliged to support it by rate? and, when rate-supported, to make use of it?" But it will at once be seen that these are principles which do not specially apply to any one institution but to many institutions. They are principles of common political application—they are, in fact, external to the institution itself, and distinct from its own special principles and methods. The effect, then, will be that the representative will be chosen on principles that are already familiar to the minds of the electors, and not on principles that peculiarly and specially affect the institution in question. Existing controversies will influence the minds of the electors, and the constituency will be divided according to the lines of existing party divisions. Both school boards and municipal government yield an example that popular elections must be fought out on simple and familiar questions. The existing political grooves are cut too deeply to allow of any escape from them.
"But," it may be replied, "as intelligence increases, and certain great political questions which are always protruding themselves are definitely settled, the electorate may become capable of conducting their contests simply with regard to the principles which really belong to the matter itself." Another difficulty arises here. Without discussing the possible settlement of these ever-recurring political questions, it ought to be remembered that, in the case of increased intelligence, we should have an increase in the number of different views affecting the principles and methods of the institution in question; and, as we should still have only one representative to represent us, it would be less possible for him than before to represent our individual convictions. If he represent A he can not represent B, nor C, nor any of those that come after C; that is to say, if A, B, C, and the others are all thinking units, and therefore do not accept submissively whatever is offered to them. He can only represent one section, and must leave other sections unrepresented. But as these individual differences
