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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.

reader. The book is, therefore, written as much as possible from an unprofessional point of view, and in a way to require no previous technical training. Although any treatment of fallacies must, to a great extent, deal with methods of proof, and must, therefore, demand a certain amount of general logical theory, yet by trying to keep chiefly in view the practical and applicable side of the science of logic, and subordinating all else to this, Professor Sidgwick claims to have been able to neglect the discussion of much debatable matter, and to avoid definite adherence to a school. Mill and Bain are chiefly followed, but the author has attempted to utilize their most important results without being compelled to accept the whole of their philosophy. The following passages from Professor Sidgwick's introductory chapter may serve to illustrate the point of view from which he regards his subject, and also his fresh and unconventional manner of writing upon it:

Logic holds what may well be called an uncomfortable position among the sciences. According to some authorities, it can not be properly said that a body of accepted logical doctrines exists; according to others, the facts and laws that form such doctrine are so completely undeniable, that to state them is hardly to convey new or important information. Hence, if a writer on the science tries to avoid truism, and so to give practical importance to his statements, there is danger both of real but crude innovation, and also of over-simple belief in the value of merely verbal alterations. Moreover, at its best, logic has many persistent enemies, and by no means all of them are in the wrong; so that those who view the science as the thief or burglar views the law, find themselves apparently supported and kept in countenance by others who really have the right to view it as perhaps the artist views the rules that hamper genius. Through its deep connection with common sense, logic is often a source of exasperation to philosophy proper; while common sense, on the other hand, is apt to dread or dislike it as unpractical or over-fond of casuistical refinements. Failing thus to win a steady footing, it turns, sometimes, to physical science for a field of operations; but physical science has its proper share of boldness, and often leaves the cautious reasoner behind. As for art—which finds even common sense too rigid—here logic is liable to meet with opposition at every grade; from the righteous inpatience of poetic souls that are genuinely under grace, down to the incoherent anger of mere boastful vagueness, or to the outcry of the sentimental idler.

In the midst of these perplexities, it is difficult to choose a quite satisfactory course. Some excuses may, however, be offered for the line that has here been taken; and, first, I would plead, as against the charge of irregularity or presumption, the fact that I have wished to keep a single purpose in view, avoiding all questions that fail to bear directly upon it. Usually in works on logic, the object has been to say something valuable upon all the questions traditionally treated as within the field of the science, and, in attempting this, the single, practical purpose is apt to become obscured. It is only in consequence of my avoidance of side-issues that any appearance of novelty in the treatment has followed. Moreover, it is not teaching, but suggestion that is chiefly here intended. It is always allowable to write rather in the co-operative spirit than the didactic, and this has certainly been my aim throughout. And the same apology may apply to the charge of forcing verbal changes upon the reader; the novelties of statement are here put forward merely as possible aids in keeping our single purpose clear, and, in fact, I found them almost unavoidable.

As regards physical science, it must be confessed that logic merely follows after it, systematizing methods already adopted there, and found to lead to good results. And I hold that to combat fallacy is the raison d'être of logic; and that science, though not infallible, is more free from discoverable fallacies than any other field of thought. Again, while experimental methods may no doubt be capable of much improvement, it seems a tenable view that the duty should be left to a special and very advanced department of inquiry. There might, perhaps, be formulated a system of advice for discovery in general—rules and hints important even to the leading men of science. But, in the mean time, logic (as usually understood) can hardly help containing a good deal of elementary matter, and is compelled to take for granted in the learner a power of making very elementary mistakes. It seems that the best scientific discovery must always be in advance of inductive logic, in much the same way as the best employment of language runs in advance of grammar. Still, there may be some use in trying to direct and help those who are not already scientific, or only in the earlier stages of the pursuit; nor need the name of logic compel logicians to claim a dignity beyond their power. One can not fulfill successfully the duties of lord chancellor and justice of the peace at once.

A Natural History Reader. For School and Home. Compiled and arranged by James Johonnot, author of "Principles and Practice of Teaching," etc. New York: Pp. 414. D. Appleton & Co. Price, $1.25.

The work of the compiler of this volume has been executed with intelligence, taste, and good practical judgment, and he has made of it a most interesting book of natural history for general reading. It is an excellent sign of the healthy growth of an interest in science when works of this kind are called for and introduced into schools. The literature of science must