August sun. It seems as if all chivalry had departed; it has but changed its ways.
The object of 'flanking' a position is to so manage as to turn that attenuated line into a mass of men upon which to let loose with dire effect either the quick-firing guns or the sharp edges of our horsemen's sabers.
Notice those long, bent, black lines, bending like fish hooks. The arrow heads indicate the direction of a flanking attack; from 'F', through the woods, up the ravine, to fall upon the exposed end of the enemy's front at 'K'. Such would be our most feasible method of flanking; the foe might, however, have anticipated us, either by providing a bloody hospitality somewhere in that ravine, or by a flank movement of his own, as the bent black line shows, around the woods, to fall upon our right flank at 'F'. Such an operation, if successful for them, would be utterly disastrous to us.
Surprised by a sudden and unexpected attack upon the weakest point and unable to change front in time, men lose heart, forget discipline, huddle in masses, confused and disorganized, or fly like sheep, in either case food for firearms, gluttonous of such occasions. It requires sometimes but a very small force upon a flank to produce great results; the appearance upon the field, even at a distance, of Joseph E. Johnston's corps at the first Bull Run was sufficient to demoralize the whole Union army, and at the battle of Arcola, Bonaparte completely flanked the Austrians with a few flourishes of his trumpets.
So we have for a third maxim of war the necessity of protected flanks. If we know or think that a Johnston lurks on either hand, we ought to be sure of our Pattersons; if we apprehend an unfriendly visit from a Blucher, we should see to it that our Grouchy is trustworthy.
Let us now broaden our view of operations, that we may see how the principles established for a limited number of men on the march, in the field, or behind fortifications, may apply upon a larger scale. To this end a brief study of the map (9) will show four contiguous countries—'A', very populous, powerful and wealthy, having a navy capable of control of the high seas, and a large and efficient army; 'C' represents a country even more populous, but not aggressive, 'D' an insignificant power, while 'B' is a country considerable in extent, but largely mountainous, and sparsely inhabited by a rude but warlike people.
A cause of war comes up between 'A' and 'B'. In ancient times the ruder nation would have been the aggressor, tempted by the wealth and invited by the enervated populace of the larger civilization. Now the conditions are likely to be reversed. However, war begins; the forces of 'A' move hastily towards the frontier, while his fleet blockades 'B's' solitary seaport at the point 'E'. The maxim of caution now
