tellectual progress, this is equally the law of emotional progress. The emotions are compounded out of simple feelings, or rather out of the ideas of them; the higher emotions are compounded out of the lower emotions; and thus there is progressing integration. For the same reason there is progressing complexity: each larger consolidated aggregate of ideal feelings contains more varied, as well as more numerous, clusters of components. The extension of the correspondence in Space, too, though lest manifest, may still be asserted: witness the difference between the proprietary feeling in the savage, responding only to a few material objects adjacent to him—weapons, decorations, food, place of shelter, etc.—and the proprietary feeling in the civilized man, who owns land in Canada, shares in an Australian mine, Egyptian stock, and mortgage-bonds on an Indian railway. And, that the extension of the correspondence in Time may be asserted of the more evolved emotions will be manifest, on remembering how the sentiment of possession is gratified by acts of which the fruition can come only after many years, and even gets pleasure from an ideal power over bequeathed property; and on remembering how the sentiment of justice seeks satisfaction in reforms that are to benefit future generations.
As pointed out in a later division of the "Principles of Psychology," a more special measure of mental development is the degree of representativeness in the states of consciousness. Cognitions and feelings were both classified in the ascending order of presentative, presentative-representative, representative, and re-representative. This general order has been necessary; since there must have been presentation before representation, and representation before re-representation. It was shown, too, that this more special standard harmonizes with the more general standard; since increasing representativeness in the states of consciousness is shown by the more extensive integrations of ideas, by the greater definiteness with which they are represented, by the greater complexity of the integrated groups, as well as by the greater heterogeneity among their elements; and here it may be added that greater representativeness is also shown by the greater distances in space and time to which the representations extend.
There is a further measure which may be serviceably used along with the other two. As was shown in the "Principles of Psychology:"
"Mental evolution, both intellectual and emotional, may be measured by the degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action. The formation of sudden, irreversible conclusions on the slenderest evidence is less distant from reflex action than is the formation of deliberate and modifiable conclusions after much evidence has been collected. And similarly, the quick passage of simple emotions into the particular kinds of conduct they prompt is less distant from reflex action than is the comparatively-hesitating passage of compound emotions into kinds of conduct determined by the joint instigation of their components."
