which properly belong to Metaphysics; and will receive instead a distinct conception of the true objects of historical inquiry, and what belongs to them; with a Logic of historical Truth:—and thus, even in this inexhaustible province, we shall have a sure progress according to rule instead of an uncertain groping in the dark.
As the substance of all Knowledge has its fixed law, so both its scientific and popular expression have their settled rules. Have these been transgressed?—then the error may perhaps be discovered by some one else, and corrected in a new work:—have they not been transgressed, or am I unable to make any improvement on that which already exists?—why should I change it for the mere sake of change? In every Science let the best scientific and the best popular works remain the only ones, until something really better appear to take their place;—then let the former be altogether laid aside, and the latter alone remain. True, the unlearned public is a progressive body; for its members are presumed to advance in the ranks of culture by means of the fit teaching of the Learned, and what they already know they do not need to be taught again. It is thus quite conceivable that a popular work, which is well suited to the period of its appearance, may afterwards, when the Time has changed, become no longer adequate to its purpose, and must be replaced by another; but this progress will certainly not be so rapid that the people shall need to be supplied with something new every half-year.
From Reason as Knowledge, I have said above, the whole domain of Science may be surveyed. Every Scholar must be in possession of this Knowledge, were it only that he may thereby be able at all times to understand the actual state of the scientific world, and thus to know at what point his labour may be most advantageously applied. There is no reason why this actual condition of the scientific world should not be chronicled in a continuous work devoted to
