Page:Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1889) Vol 2.djvu/280

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who is himself but a half man, what does he know of the power of Human Nature? That it is possible can be known only by its actual accomplishment in ourselves; and before its possibility is recognised in this way, and man has elevated himself in his own person to Pure Morality, he can have no entrance whatever into the domain of True Religion; for Religion also annexes no visible consequences to individual acts of Duty.—So much for the refutation of that portion of error which arises from the calumnious slander of Pure Morality.

Again, he who faithfully obeys the Law of Duty, as such, does not understand the ultimate aim of this Law. It is clear,—since he, notwithstanding this ignorance, maintains an unvarying and unconditional obedience; since, further, the Law of Duty, although not understood, speaks forth constantly and invariably within him,—that this want of comprehension causes no difference in his actions;—but it is another question whether such a want of comprehension is consistent with his dignity as a rational being. He does not indeed any longer follow the concealed law of the Universe nor the blind impulses of Nature, but a conception,—and in doing so he acts, thus far, a nobler part. But this conception itself is not clear to him, and, with reference to it, he himself is blind; his obedience therefore remains but a blind obedience;—he is led on by a nobler instinct indeed, but still with bandaged eyes. But if this position be inconsistent with the dignity of Reason, as it unquestionably is, and if there lie in Reason itself a power and therefore an impulse to penetrate to the meaning of the Law of Duty, then will this impulse be a source of constant disturbance and dissatisfaction to him, and if he still continue to hold by blind obedience, he will have no other course than to harden himself against this secret desire. However perfect may be his conduct,—that is, his outward and apparent existence,—there is still