Page:Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1889) Vol 2.djvu/90

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

floor. To make this clear by two examples selected at random: Should some one, for instance, with his head full of the unhappy, newly invented, confusion of language according to which every thought may, by a pleasant change of expression, be named Idea, and in which there is no objection to speaking of the idea of a chair or a bench;—should such an one wonder how so much importance is attached to the dedication of Life to Ideas, and how in this can be placed the characteristic distinction between two opposite classes of men, whereas everything which enters the mind of any human being is Idea; such an one has understood nothing at all of what we have hitherto said; but without any fault of ours. For we have not failed strictly to discriminate between Conceptions which, by means of Experience, find their way into the understanding of the mere sensuous man; and Ideas which, independent of all Experience, kindle into self-sustaining life in those who are inspired by them.

Or should any one be unable to get over a certain catchword, brought into circulation, with others of the same kind of which it would be quite as difficult to give any rational account, by some conceited bel esprit,—the word Individuality—fair, lovely Individuality!—and with this understanding of the word, which may indeed be true in one sense, find himself unable to reconcile our unconditional rejection of all Individuality;—then such an one has not understood that by Individuality we mean only the personal, sensuous existence of the Individual, which is the true meaning of the word; and by no means deny, but rather expressly teach and inculcate, that the One Eternal Idea assumes a new and hitherto unknown form in each Individual in whom it comes to Life, and this by its own power and under its own legislation, and quite independently of physical nature:—consequently in no way determined thereto by the sensuous Individuality, but on the contrary abolishing such Individuality altogether, and of