186 PSYCHOLOGY. thouglit indiflferentlj. Moreover, * feeling ' has acquired in the hearts of platoniziug thinkers a very opprobrious set of implications ; and since one of the great obstacles to mutual understanding in philosophy is the use of words eulogisti- cally and disparagingly, impartial terms ought always, if possible, to be preferred. The word psychosis has been proposed by Mr. Huxley. It has the advantage of being correlative to neurosis (the name applied by the same author to the corresponding nerve-process), and is moreover tech- nical and devoid of partial implications. But it has no verb or other grammatical form allied to it. The expres- sions ' affection of the soul,' * modification of the ego,' are clumsy, like 'state of consciousness,' and they implicitly assert theories which it is not well to embody in terminol- ogy before they have been openly discussed and approved. ' Idea ' is a good vague neutral word, and was by Locke employed in the broadest generic way ; but notwithstanding his authority it has not domesticated itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations, and it moreover has no verb. ' Thought ' would be by far the best word to use if it could be made to cover sensations. It has no opprobri- ous connotation such as ' feeling ' has, and it immediately suggests the omnipresence of cognition (or reference to an object other than the mental state itself), which we shall soon see to be of the mental life's essence. But can the expression 'thought of a toothache' ever suggest to the reader the actual present pain itself ? It is hardly possi- ble ; and we thus seem about to be forced back on some pair of terms like Hume's ' impression and idea,' or Ham- ilton's ' presentation and representation,' or the ordinary
- feeling and thought,' if we wish to cover the whole ground.
In this quandary we can make no definitive choice, but must, according to the convenience of the context, use sometimes one, sometimes another of the synonyms that have been mentioned. My oivn partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT. I shall probably often use both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers by their unusual sound ; but if the con- nection makes it clear that mental states at large, irrespec-
