numbers. The first number therefore, is generative, mensurative, and perfective of generated natures.
CHAPTER XXXV.
The first order therefore of intelligibles and intellectuals is thus surveyed by Parmenides. But after this the order which possesses the middle place of intelligibles and intellectuals, and which a little before we called connective, presents itself to the view. It is however denominated in a three-fold respect, viz. one, many, whole, parts, finite, infinite. For since the separation of unities and beings from number, extends to it, the one and being, which we have said difference divides, become wholes; But the things proceeding from these, are the parts of these; And wholeness indeed connectedly contains parts, but these are contained by their wholeness, in one way indeed, by the one, but in another by being. For there indeed, I mean in the summit of the intellectual Gods, unity was the cause of multitude, at the same time being exempt from multitude, and generative of the many. But here unity is coarranged with multitude. Hence also it is a whole which has reference to many unities as to parts. Since however, the connective order is triple, one division of it being intelligible, another intelligible and intellectual, and another intellectual, the first monad indeed subsists according to the one and the many; but the second, according to whole and parts; and the third, according to the finite and the infinite. For where the first triad ends, there the second has its beginning. Hence, in the triad prior to this, Parmenides infers that the one is many. And in this triad, he concludes the same thing together with what remains. There however, the one was generative of infinites; but here the one is comprehensive of many, the whole of parts, and the finite of infinites. Hence, there indeed, unity is
