Ion. Oh! Jupiter!—how much better!
Socrates. Amongst a number of persons employed in solving a problem of arithmetic, might not a person know, my dear Ion, which had given the right answer?
Ion. Certainly.
Socrates. The same person who had been aware of the false one, or some other?
Ion. The same, clearly.
Socrates. That is, some one who understood arithmetic?
Ion. Certainly.
Socrates. Among a number of persons giving their opinions on the wholesomeness of different foods, whether would one person be capable to pronounce upon the rectitude of the opinions of those who judged rightly, and another on the erroneousness of those which were incorrect, or would the same person be competent to decide respecting them both?
Ion. The same, evidently.
Socrates. What would you call that person?
Ion. A physician.
Socrates. We may assert then, universally, that the same person who is competent to determine the truth, is competent also to determine the falsehood of whatever assertion is advanced on the same subject; and, it is manifest, that he who cannot judge respecting the falsehood, or unfitness of what is said upon a given subject, is equally incompetent to determine upon its truth or beauty?
Ion. Assuredly.
Socrates. The same person would then be competent or incompetent for both?
Ion. Yes.
Socrates. Do you not say that Homer and the other poets, and among them Hesiod and Archilochus, speak of the same things, but unequally; one better and the other worse?
