Jackson, J., concurring
and against the possibility that Chapter 73 might define (in substance) the universe of offenses that “relat[e] to obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), as Congress meant that phrase to be interpreted. Nor would running that issue to ground here change the outcome.[1] As the Court notes, multiple Chapter 73 offenses require no pending proceeding. §1512(f); see also 102 Stat. 4397–4398 (1988 Congress describing an amendment to §1512 as an “obstruction of justice amendmen[t]” (boldface deleted)). That suffices to resolve the question before us even under a Chapter 73-focused approach. The issue of whether such an approach best tracks Congress’s intent can be reserved for future consideration in a case where the parties joust in earnest on the question.
- ↑ Before this Court, Pugin did not root his arguments in the Chapter 73-focused paradigm that I sketch here. I agree with the Court that the arguments he did make do not require reversing the Fourth Circuit.
