Sotomayor, J., dissenting
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines “aggravated felony” by enumerating a long list of offenses. §1101(a)(43). Some are federal criminal offenses, but others are undefined generic offenses, such as “burglary,” §1101(a)(43)(G), and “obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), which is relevant here.
To assess whether someone’s conviction is covered by a generic offense, our precedents dictate that courts use the “categorical approach.” Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 389. That approach disregards facts about the conviction and instead “compare[s] the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 570 U. S. 254, 257 (2013). If the elements of the underlying crime of conviction are narrower than or the same as the elements of the generic offense, then there is a “categorical match,” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U. S. 184, 190 (2013), and the underlying offense is an aggravated felony. If there is no categorical match, then the conviction is not an aggravated felony, no matter the underlying facts.
Before a court can engage in this categorical comparison, however, it must discern the “basic elements” of the relevant “generic” offense. Taylor v. United States, 495 U. S. 575, 599 (1990). Courts accomplish this task by looking for “evidence about the generic meaning” of the offense at the time of the statute’s enactment. Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 395. This means looking for the “generally accepted contemporary meaning” of the generic offense, while setting aside more unusual “nongeneric” variants that are “defin[ed] … more broadly.” Taylor, 495 U. S., at 596, 599. In Taylor, for example, this Court concluded, after surveying various sources of meaning, that for purposes of 18 U. S. C. §924(e), “generic burglary” encompasses any crime
