authority reflects common sense. Individuals can obstruct the process of justice even when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. Indeed, obstruction of justice is often “most effective” when it prevents “an investigation or proceeding from commencing in the first place.” Brief for Attorney General 15. The Court declines to adopt an interpretation of the statute that would exclude many common obstruction offenses from the definition of aggravated felony under §1101(a)(43)(S). Finally, the phrase “relating to” resolves any doubt about the scope of §1101(a)(43)(S), because it ensures that the statute covers offenses having a connection with obstruction of justice—which surely covers common obstruction offenses that can occur when an investigation or proceeding is not pending.
Pugin’s and Cordero-Garcia’s contrary arguments lack merit. First, even if a specific prohibition in 18 U. S. C. §1503(a) requires that an investigation or proceeding be pending, Congress defined offenses under §1101(a)(43)(S) more broadly. Second, the historical record does not support the claim that obstruction of justice requires that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Third, reading §1101(a)(43)(S) to cover offenses that do not require a pending investigation or proceeding may create some redundancy, but the better overall reading of a statute sometimes contains some redundancy. Fourth, resort to the rule of lenity has no place here because the traditional tools of statutory interpretation show that an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. Pp. 3–10.
No. 22–23, 19 F. 4th 437, affirmed; No. 22–331, 44 F. 4th 1181, reversed and remanded.
Kavanaugh, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Roberts, C. J., and
Thomas,
Alito,
Barrett, and
Jackson, JJ., joined.
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion.
Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Gorsuch, J., joined, and in which
Kagan, J., joined as to all but Part III.
