made that is recognised as in the public interest or in circumstances where legitimate means of addressing the matters of concern were not available. It is important to note that no attempt was made in the sentencing proceedings either to establish that Mr McBride's thefts or disclosures were somehow in the public interest or that the legitimate and lawful means by which Mr McBride could have raised his concerns were inadequate.
233․ The need for specific deterrence is somewhat less than that for general deterrence. It is, however, significant that the offender has no remorse and still considers that he did the right thing. Mr McBride needs to be deterred from any further disclosures of military information which he learned during his service as a soldier.
234․ Two factors qualify the need for specific deterrence. First, it is unlikely that he will be placed in any position of equivalent trust in government or the military in the future. Despite that, the intensive correction order assessment report makes reference to him continuing to practice as a solicitor, a situation in which compliance with obligations of confidentiality remains fundamental. Second, it is clear that the process of being subject to criminal charges has had a substantial impact upon him (and thereby his family) and this will tend to have a deterrent effect upon him which reduces the significance of specific deterrence in the sentence.
235․ The sentence must ensure that he is adequately punished for his offending (s 16A(2)(k)). Punishment must adequately reflect the importance of the obligations which were breached. In relation to count 3, the sentence must take into account that there will be no punishment for the conduct the subject of the's 16BA schedule offence.
236․ The relevant aspects of his character, antecedents, age, means and physical or mental condition have been described earlier in these reasons (s 16A(2)(m)). So far as his mental condition at the time of the offending and today are concerned, I have accepted Mr Borenstein's conclusion that during the offending Mr McBride suffered from a number of mental health conditions. I also accept Mr Borenstein's evidence that his present condition has improved with psychiatric and psychological treatment as well as exercise. I have concluded, despite Mr McBride's statement to the contrary, that his mental health conditions made a material, albeit minor and indirect, contribution to his offending conduct. That is relevant to his moral culpability but only in a minor way. I do not consider that his mental health conditions have any significant consequence for the suitability of his sentence as a vehicle for general deterrence or the need for specific deterrence. I also accept Mr Borenstein's evidence that there is a risk of deterioration of his condition if incarcerated and that includes a risk of a significant deterioration. It is not possible to quantify the extent of that risk. Having regard to the possibility of deterioration of his
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