Page:R v Tarrant 2020 NZHC 2192 sentencing remarks.pdf/40

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ultimately to protect society. The more damaging and grave the crime the greater that need becomes. That objective of the criminal law is not to be confused with protecting the community from a particular offender, although I consider you to be a highly dangerous criminal who demonstrably has no regard for human life and who represents a very high risk of harm to others.

[177]By having regard to the circumstances of the offence and the offender, the sentence should accord with the general moral sense of the community.[1] A crime is a public wrong, and the public dimension of sentencing and the maintenance of public confidence in the criminal justice system must be kept in mind. The sentence I impose must be one that reflects the community’s repudiation of your crimes. It must represent a civilised reaction based not on emotion but justice and deliberation.[2] The Court cannot impose significantly heavier or more severe punishment than is properly justified nor beyond that required for the protection of the public interest. However, so long as the Court’s response is proportionate, society is entitled to expect the most severe penalties to be imposed to mark its condemnation of the worst crimes.[3]

[178]The retributive nature of the public punishment of crime represents a statement of society’s indignation and condemnation of the offending. By the imposition of sentence, the Court’s denunciation and, through the Court, society’s abhorrence of particular crimes is demonstrated. While public opinion and populist urgings cannot be allowed to steer sentencing, the consequences of the crime for the victims and their families, and for the community as a whole, can be major factors that push accountability to the fore. The seriousness of the offending and the sanctity of life may leave little room for other than a denunciatory sentence that marks society’s condemnation of the crime.[4] This clearly is such a case.

[179]Having given the matter much consideration, I am satisfied that no minimum period of imprisonment would be sufficient to satisfy the legitimate need to hold you

  1. R v Cuthbert [1967] 2 NSWR 329 (NSWCCA) at 330; and Regina v Howells [1999] 1 WLR 307 (CA) at 312.
  2. R v Puru [1984] 1 NZLR 248 (CA) at 249.
  3. Puru, above n 48, at 254.
  4. Sargeant v R (1974) 60 Cr App R 74 (CA) at 77 per Lawton CJ, cited in Geoff Hall Sentencing Law and Practice (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014) at 103.