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Archbishop of Dublin's remark on this argument:
"The only objection which at the first glance appears to have any plausibility, would be perceived, I think, on a very little reflection, to be extremely feeble, namely, the supposed advantage (under the prohibition of such marriages) of a widower's being enabled without scandal to reside with his deceased wife's sister.
"In fact, nothing more effectually guards against any such scandal than its being known, that, if any one were so disposed, they were at liberty to marry.
"But as for any abhorrence of cohabitation between them, as monstrous and unnatural being created by a law prohibiting their marriage, no idea can be more absurd. The law does not permit a woman to marry during her husband's lifetime; yet this does not obviate the scandal that would arise from the unrestrained familiar intercourse of a married woman with another man."
The worst of the apprehended evil then appears, on analysis, to be this—that, if the prohibition were removed, certain persons who (from age, habits, character, or conduct) might be expected to marry, but who are now living together without marrying, and had rather continue to do so, would be obliged to marry or to part. This is an evil of so doubtful a character, that it might be mistaken for a good.
Against it must be set—the spurious origin of the restrictive law: its doubtful authority: the
