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mentarily evercame him, as his friends tried to make out at the time, but rather a political act which had long been reflected on and carefully thought out.

Further, a document which accidentally came into my possession towards the end of July, for the first time awakened in my mind a real doubt, in regard to the systematic Germanophilism of the Bolshevik policy, which I had believed in up to then, as I have indicated already, with closed eyes. I wish to speak of a draft agreement, proposed through the intermediary of the diplomatic representative of Great Britain at Moscow, to the Allies by the Bolsheviks aof an interallied military intervention in Russia against Germany, with the cooperation and support of the Government of the Peoples Commissaries. According to the terms of this agreement, the Bolsheviks agreed to the landing of allied military forces on the northern coast of Russia as well as in the Far East. They requested the cooperation of allied instructors for the formation of a Red Army which they declared themselves ready to put in line as soon as they would be able to do so, against German Imperialism. They only asked for recognition, and the cessation of ail support to Russian counter-revolutionary elements.

On the margin of this document which suddenly opened up for me, new and undreamt of horizons, there was this annotation in blue pencil by Mr. Noulens: „I perceive the advantages for the bolsheviks, but I look in vain for any that the Allies might obtain!“ And so there did really exist an attempt on the part o the bolsheviks, these „German agents“, to come