Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/10

   
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

(U) The Committee found no evidence of Russian actors attempting to manipulate vote tallies on Election Day, though again the Committee and IC's insight into this is limited.

(U/ ) In the years since the 2016 election, awareness of the threat, activity by DHS, and measures at the state and local level to better secure election infrastructure have all shown considerable improvement. The threat, however, remains imperfectly understood. In a briefing before Senators on August 22, 2018, DNI Daniel Coats, FBI Director Christopher Wray, then-DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, and then-DHS Undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Division Christopher Krebs told Senators that there were no known threats to election infrastructure. However, Mr. Krebs also said that top election vulnerabilities remain, including the administration of the voter databases and the tabulation of the data, with the latter being a much more difficult target to attack.^[1] Relatedly, several weeks prior to the 2018 mid-term election, DHS assessed that "numerous actors are regularly targeting election infrastructure, likely for different purposes, including to cause disruptive effects, steal sensitive data, and undermine confidence in the election."^[2]

 ^{[3]  [4]}

IV. (U) ELEMENTS OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES

A. (U) Targeting Activity

  Scanning of election-related state infrastructure by Moscow was the most widespread activity the IC and DHS elements observed in the run up to the 2016 election.^[5]

•   In an interview with the Committee, Mr. Daniel stated: "What it mostly looked like to us was reconnaissance. … I would have characterized it at the time as sort of conducting the reconnaissance to do the network mapping, to do the topology mapping so

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1. (U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28, 2018.
2. (U/ ) Homeland Security Intelligence Assessment: Cyber Actors Continue to Engage in Influence Activities and Targeting of Election Infrastructure, October 11, 2018.
3. (U) DTS 2019-1368, NIC 2019-01, Intelligence Community Assessment: A Summary of the Intelligence Community Report on Foreign Interference as Directed by Executive Order 13848, March 29, 2019. p. 2-3.
4. (U) Ibid.
5. (U) SSCI interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 12.

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY