Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/13

   
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

•  ^[1]
•  ^[2]

 ^{[3]  [4]}

(U) However, IP addresses associated with the August 18, 2016 FLASH provided some indications the activity might be attributable to the Russian government, particularly the GRU:

•  ^{[5]  [6]}
•  ^{[7]  [8]}
• (U/ ) One of the Netherlands-based   "exhibited the same behavior from the same node over a period of time. … It was behaving like … the same user or group of users was using this to direct activity against the same type of targets," according to DHS staff.^[9]

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1. (U) Ibid.
2. (U) Ibid.
3. (U) Ibid.
4. (U) Ibid.
5.  
6.   FBI IIR  
7. (U) Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) Cyber Threat Intelligence Summary, October 7, 2016.
8. (U) Ibid.
9. (U) SSCI interview of representatives from DHS and CTIIC, February 27, 2018, p. 13.

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COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY