Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/37

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horribles just when you're talking about voter registration databases.[1]

(U) Chaos on Election Day: Three Scenarios

  Mr. Daniel said that in the early fall of 2016, a policy working group was looking at three scenarios:

One was, could the Russians do something to the voter registration databases that could cause problems on Election Day? An example of that would be, could you go in and flip the digits in everybody's address, so that when they show up with their photo ID it doesn't match what's in the poll book? It doesn't actually prevent people from voting. In most cases you'll still get a provisional ballot, but if this is happening in a whole bunch of precincts for just about everybody showing up, it gives the impression that there's chaos.[3]

A second one was to do a variant of the penetrating voting machines, except this time what you do is you do a nice video of somebody conducting a hack on a voting machine and showing how you could do that hack and showing them changing a voting outcome, and then you post that on YouTube and you claim you've done this 100,000 times across the United States, even though you haven't actually done it at all.[4]

Then the third scenario that we looked at was conducting a denial of service attack on the Associated Press on Election Day, because pretty much everybody, all those nice maps that everybody puts up on all the different news services, is in fact actually based on Associated Press stringers at all the different precincts and locations. … It doesn't actually change anything, but it gives the impression that there's chaos.[5]


  1. (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Lisa Monaco, Former Homeland Security Advisor, August 10, 2017, p. 28.
  2.  
  3. (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, August 31, 2017, p. 33.
  4. (U) Ibid., pp. 34-35.
  5. (U) Ibid., p. 35.

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