COMMITTEE SENSITIVE—RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
- (U) State 11 had a meeting with DHS officials, including the regional DHS cyber advisor, in August 2016, but according to State 11 officials, DHS did not mention any specific threat against election systems from a nation-state actor.[1]
- (U) State 13 reported that DHS contacted an affected county at one point, but never contacted the state-level officials.[2]
- (U) When they saw an IP address identified in the alerts had scanned their systems, State 6 and State 16 sent their logs to the MS-ISAC for analysis.[3] State 16 said it never received a response.[4]
(U) DHS, conversely, saw its efforts as far more extensive and effective. Ms. Manfra testified to SSCI that DHS "held a conference call where all 50 secretaries of state or an election director if the secretary of state didn't have that responsibility [participated], in August, in September, and again in October [of 2016], both high-level engagement and network defense products [sic]."[5] Mr. Daniel reported that "by the time Election Day rolls around, all but one state has taken us up on the offer to at least do scanning[,] so I want to give people credit for not necessarily sticking to initial partisan reactions and … taking steps to protect their electoral infrastructure."[6]
(U) States reported to the Committee that Election Day went off smoothly. For most state election officials, concerns about a possible threat against election systems dropped off the radar until the summer or fall of 2017. Many state election officials reported hearing for the first time that Russian actors were responsible for scanning election infrastructure in an estimated 21 states from the press or from the Committee's open hearing on June 21, 2017. During that hearing, in response to a question from Vice Chairman Warner inquiring whether all affected states were aware they were attacked, Ms. Manfra responded that "[a]ll of the system owners within those states are aware of the targeting, yes, sir."[7] However, when pressed as to whether election officials in each state were aware, the answer was less clear.[8]
- (U) In that hearing. Dr. Liles said DHS had "worked hand-in-hand with the state and local partners to share threat information related to their networks."[9]
- ↑ (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 11], December 8, 2017.
- ↑ (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 13], December 1, 2017.
- ↑ (U) Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 6], November 17, 2017; Memorandum for the Record, SSCI Staff, Conference Call with [State 16], December 1, 2017.
- ↑ (U) Ibid. State 6 did not indicate whether they received feedback from DHS.
- ↑ (U) Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, June 21, 2017, p. 74.
- ↑ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Michael Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator, National Security Council, held on Wednesday, August 31, 2017, p. 49.
- ↑ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, held on Wednesday, June 21, 2017, p. 28.
- ↑ (U) Ibid., pp. 62-63.
- ↑ (U) Ibid., p. 12.
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