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context surrounding the indicators. Stale officials need to know why a particular threat is of significant concern, and should be prioritized. That context could come from classified information, or states could come to understand that threat information DHS passes them is more serious than that received through other sources. DHS's goal is to obtain clearances for up to three officials per state.[1] As of August 2018, DHS had provided a clearance to 92 officials;[2] as of late 2017 all state election officials had received interim secret clearances or one-day read-ins for secret-level briefings.[3] DHS, along with ODNI and FBI, also hosted state and local election officials for a SECRET-level briefing on the sidelines of the biannual NASS and NASS-ED conferences in Washington, DC in February 2018. In March, Amy Cohen, Executive Director of NASS-ED testified in front of the Committee that, "It would be naïve to say that we received answers to all our questions, but the briefing was incredibly valuable and demonstrated how seriously DHS and others take their commitment to the elections community as well as to our concerns."[4] The Committee recommends DHS continue providing such briefings and improve the quality of information shared.
(U) Fundamental to meaningful information sharing, however, is that state officials understand what they are getting. New inductees to the world of classified information are often disappointed—they expected to see everything laid out in black and white, when intelligence is often very gray, with a pattern discernable only to those who know where to look and what conclusions to draw. Those sharing the intelligence should manage expectations—at the SECRET level, officials are likely to see limited context about conclusions, but not much more.
(U) Federal officials should work to declassify information, for the purpose of providing warning to appropriate state and local officials, to the greatest extent possible. If key pieces of context could be provided at a lower classification level while still protecting classified information, DHS and its partners should strive to do so.
- 4. (U) Build a Stronger Defense, Part III: Secure Election-Related Cyber Systems
(U) Despite the expense, cybersecurity needs to become a higher priority for election-related infrastructure. The Committee found a wide range of cybersecurity practices across the states. Some states were highly focused on building a culture of cybersecurity; others were severely under-resourced and relying on part-time help.
(U) The Committee recommends State officials work with DHS to evaluate the security of their election systems end-to-end and prioritize implementing the following steps to secure voter registration systems, state records, and other pre-election activities. The Committee additionally recommends that State officials:
- ↑ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21, 2018, p. 15.
- ↑ (U) DTS 2018-3275, Summary of 8/22/2018 All Senators Election Security Briefing, August 28, 2018.
- ↑ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21, 2018, p. 15, 26.
- ↑ (U) SSCI Transcript of the Open Hearing on Election Security, held on March 21, 2018, p. 113.
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