principles which had governed them when in power. The only doubt that now exists of the measure being perfectly justifiable, is, with respect to the extent and degree of danger to this country from allowing the Danish fleet to be armed and equipped; for if the capture or destruction of that fleet was essential to the security of this country, all the world must acknowledge the measure to be justified by the necessity in which it originated: self-defence, which is the first law of nature, is also the first principle of morality, and there is no maxim in politics more universally assented to, than that "salus populi suprema lex est.” As to the other reproach which was thrown out against this country by Russia, and in the justice of which all Europe agreed, that we were the first to stimulate others to war, and the last to expose ourselves to the dangers of it, this reproach appeared but too well founded. It was certainly impossible for England to send armies to the defence of the Continent equal to those which France could pour forth for its subjugation; but it by no means followed, that because we could not be principals in a continental war, we should therefore give no military assistance to those who were fighting the battles of Europe; nor does it seem to be a necessary consequence, that because we were unable to do every thing, that therefore we should do nothing. It was utterly inconceivable to the people of the Continent, that this united kingdom, with its population of sixteen millions, with an immense army upon paper, and having abundant means to equip and ships to convey her armies, should yet see nation after nation overthrown without making the slightest effort to save them. Bonaparte took advantage of this feeling upon the Continent, to calumniate the British nation, to describe them as worthless and dangerous allies, and to make all other nations at least indifferent about the fate of this country. On the 17th of December, 1807, he published his celebrated decree at Milan, declaring the British islands in a state of blockade, and denationalizing the ships of any neutral power which submitted to be searched at sea by British ships of war. At this time there was not a spot of the Continent of Europe open to British commerce except Sweden; and the United States of America had, by their 1 non-importation and embargo laws, entered into the views of Bonaparte. This country was threatened not only with the loss of its commerce, with famine in the case of a bad harvest, but with the physical force of all Europe, combined and directed by the genius and energy of the ruler of France.
Such was the situation of the country at the conclusion of the year 1807. On the first day of the year 1808, the Austrian ambassador, Count Stahremburgh, presented a note to Mr. Canning, the secretary for foreign affairs, stating that he was authorized (but not mentioning whether by his own master or Bonaparte), to propose that this country should send plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat for peace. The answer of our government was, that we were also disposed for peace, but that before plenipotentiaries were appointed, it was necessary to know on what terms France was willing to treat. A few days after receiving this answer,
