of their national militia, the defensive force of Austria has been nearly doubled in the course of the present year. The Turkish empire, which appeared sunk to the lowest degree of weakness, has gained considerably in strength by its last revolution; and by the energy and talents displayed by its grand vizier, Mustapha Bairactar, it is no longer that feeble country over which a French army might march without opposition to the conquest of Persia and India. Turkey, like Austria, now presents to view a great nation preparing itself for an important crisis. The prejudices of ages have yielded to the necessity of the times, and Eastern Europe may yet present a formidable barrier against the universal empire to which Bonaparte aspires. To these events we must also add, the experiment which the United States of America have made, of starring Europe into compliance with their terms, by the operation of their embargo act: an experiment which, however, has completely failed; for, besides that they have been the principal, if not the only sufferers, they have taught our West India planters to appreciate their own resources, and have lent a fostering hand to the more extended cultivation of our own Transatlantic dominions. From these considerations it will appear, that the prospects of the world are somewhat brighter now than they were at the close of the year 1807.
The war which the Emperor of Russia commenced against Sweden in the beginning of 1808, was not preceded by any provocation or cause of complaint on the part of the King of Sweden. The Emperor Alexander (under the dictation of Bonaparte) invited him to join in a confederacy against England: he refused to do so, and the emperor immediately published a declaration of war against him, on the ground, that “the relations between Russia and Sweden must be no longer uncertain.” The court of Denmark also about the same time published a declaration of war against Sweden, containing the same expression. This phrase was evidently of French origin, and meant that Sweden must resign its own independence, and act in the same manner that Bonaparte prescribed to his other vassals. The King of Sweden answered the Russian manifesto with great firmness, and stated that he had resisted an offer made to him in the last year by Bonaparte, of recovering all the provinces which Charles XII. had lost to Russia, if he would join the continental confederacy against England. Formidable preparations of war were made both by Russia and Denmark. A very considerable Russian army entered Swedish Finland in the month of February, and threatened nothing less than to march to Stockholm in the course of the campaign; a combined French and Danish army threatened to cross the Sound, and invade Sweden in that quarter: fortunately, however, for the King of Sweden, the capture of the Danish fleet in the preceding year rendered this measure impracticable. He, on his side, made vigorous preparations for carrying on the war against both Russia and Denmark: he sent a considerable army into Finland, and another force to invade Norway. On the side of Norway, the Swedish troops had at the commencement of the campaign considerable advantages,
