to contain. He agreed with the proposition that effectively it is someone who is trying to run away. Person 14 described a squirter as a fighting age male leaving the vicinity of the VRI (Very Reliable Intelligence). Person 11 said that in 2012, his understanding of a squirter was any individual who was attempting to flee a target area in the presence of Coalition Forces. Person 32 said that he understood a squirter to be someone fleeing the target area, for example, a target building or out of a cordon, either on foot or on a motorbike. Person 38 understood a squirter to be someone who was leaving an area of interest in a suspicious manner, usually because they did not want to be processed or identified and they were moving in a manner that was not normal. It could be somebody who is moving fast.
591 Person 81 gave evidence to the effect that he would not describe a person approaching a compound as a "squirter". He said:
So we may take it that what you were told after the mission was that, upon breaching the compound and commencing clearing, there was an attempt to squirt by insurgents?---Yes.
Now, is this right: you certainly don't have any recollection of being told, either during the mission or after the mission, that while G Troop was present at Whisky 108 there had been any EKIAs of insurgents who were approaching – the insurgents who were approaching the compound?---No. I don't recall that.
And if you had been told that, ie, that insurgents had approached the compound, you wouldn't have described that situation in the report as "insurgents squirting"; correct?---That is correct.
592 The applicant also referred to a report, Australian Special Operations Task Group (ASOTG), titled "Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) results from TF66–A Operations in Deh Rafshan", and said to be correct as at 15 April 2009 and, in particular, the references therein to an eastern tunnel, a southern tunnel and a northern tunnel which is consistent (so the applicant submits) with references in the Patrol Debrief to "tunnel systems, false walls and cache locations throughout the compound". The report also contains the following information:
2. …TF66-A conducted special operations in DEH RAFSHAN (specifically KAKARAK and SEYYEDAN) over the period 11 – 13 Apr. On 11 Apr, the FE conducted ‘cordon and call out' and subsequent clearances of compounds W0108 and W0109 near KAKARAK. The details of actions taken on target and initial TSE results are provided in ref A.
3. … In addition to an INS KIA 500m South of W0108, a further two INS were KIA; one of these 10m from the North-west corner of W0108 and third 5m from the North-west corner of W0108. Hand held imagery was captured of the first INS but not of the second and third INS due to the tactical situation at the time.
