their natural and ordinary meaning.
32 In Jones v Skelton [1963] 1 WLR 1362, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council said (at 1370–1371):
The ordinary and natural meaning of words may be either the literal meaning or it may be an implied or inferred or an indirect meaning: any meaning that does not require the support of extrinsic facts passing beyond general knowledge but is a meaning which is capable of being detected in the language used can be a part of the ordinary and natural meaning of words. See Lewis v. Daily Telegraph Ltd. The ordinary and natural meaning may therefore include any implication or inference which a reasonable reader guided not by any special but only by general knowledge and not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction would draw from the words.
(Citation omitted.)
33 It is necessary to consider the publication as a whole and conspicuous headlines, headings and captions must be given due weight (John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin [2003] HCA 50; (2003) 77 ALJR 1657; (2003) 201 ALR 77 at [26] per McHugh J). The emphasis provided by the publisher, for example, by the size of the headline relative to the whole publication, is not to be ignored (Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd (1979) 141 CLR 632 at 646 per Aickin J).
34 In the context of submissions concerning meaning, the respondents referred to what has been called the "single meaning" rule and what the respondents described as gradations of seriousness.
35 The single meaning rule was discussed by Diplock LJ in Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 QB 157 (at 174):
… The decision as to defamatory meanings which words are capable of bearing is reserved to the judge, and for this reason, and no other, is called a question of law. The decision as to the particular defamatory meaning within that category which the words do bear is reserved to the jury, and for this reason, and no other, is called a question of fact. But the recognition that there may be more than one meaning which reasonable men might understand words to bear does not absolve the jury from the duty of deciding upon one of those meanings as being the only "natural and ordinary meaning" of the words. Juries, in theory, must be unanimous upon every issue on which they have to adjudicate; and since the damages that they award must depend upon the defamatory meaning that they attribute to the words, they must all agree upon a single meaning as being the "right" meaning. And so the unexpressed major premise, that any particular combination of words can bear but a single "natural and ordinary meaning" which is "right", survived the transfer from judge to jury of the function of adjudicating upon the meaning of words in civil actions for libel.
But where an action for libel is tried by a judge alone without a jury, it is he who has to arrive at a single "right" meaning as "the natural and ordinary meaning" of the words complained of; and with the concentration of functions in a single adjudicator, the need
