Page:Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 41) (2023, FCA).pdf/37

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ordinary reasonable reader could not reasonably conclude that the applicant had actually engaged in the act of domestic violence. The ordinary reasonable reader may strongly suspect that he had, but the ordinary reasonable reader would not conclude that he must have committed an act of domestic violence and that he is guilty of it.

71 In relation to the imputations said to be conveyed or communicated by the Group 3 articles more generally, the respondents rely on the following matters.

72 In support of their contention that the articles give rise to an imputation of reasonable grounds to suspect rather than guilt, the respondents rely on the fact that sprinkled throughout the articles are references to "claims", "rumours" and "allegations". The respondents do not contend that those references are decisive. They acknowledge that they are not as the cases make clear. In Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd, Lord Devlin said (at 283–284):

In the first place, he [counsel for the plaintiffs] relies on what I have called the 'rumour cases'. I agree, of course, that you cannot escape liability for defamation by putting the libel behind a prefix such as 'I have been told that …' or 'It is rumoured that …', and then asserting that it was true that you had been told or that it was in fact being rumoured. You have, as Horridge J. said, in a passage that was quoted with approval by Greer LJ in Cookson v Harewood, 'to prove that the subject-matter of the rumour was true'. … For the purpose of the law of libel a hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement, and that is all there is to it.

(Citation omitted.)

73 The same point is made in Australian Defamation Law and Practice (NexisLexis Butterworths, subscription service) at [3410] (update 92) and Gatley on Libel and Slander (13th ed, Thomson Reuters, 2022) at 12-017. In the latter text, the following appears:

This is because 'repeating someone else's libellous statement is just as bad as making the statement directly', and therefore 'for the purpose of the law of libel a hearsay statement is the same as a direct statement'.

(Footnotes omitted.)

74 The respondents submit that in assessing whether an imputation of guilt rather than an imputation of reasonable grounds to suspect is conveyed or communicated by the articles, the ordinary reasonable reader would have regard to the applicant's description of the sources of the allegations made against him. In para 88 of the article, the applicant's supporters are said to insist that the allegations stem from envy and most particularly from disgruntled veterans. I assume the point being made is that the reference to biased or potentially biased sources would


Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 41) [2023] FCA 555
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