8. The absence of other witnesses who were present at Darwan
153 With respect to the mission to Darwan, the applicant submitted that if the cliff kick had happened, half the troop would have seen the cliff kick. He submitted that the problem with this is that it is conjecture and speculation based on evidence of one group which is not corroborated by other evidence. The applicant submitted that there are hypotheticals, but no evidence and certainly nothing put to people to explain the behaviour.
154 This is not a lacuna or vacuum in the evidence such that the material is so limited that it does not form an appropriate basis to reach a reasonable decision. It is a matter to be considered in relation to events during the mission to Darwan.
Conclusion
155 None of these matters, individually or collectively, lead to the conclusion that the material is so limited that it does not form an appropriate basis on which to reach a reasonable decision. A number of them or associated matters will need to be considered in determining the facts which should be found. The Jones v Dunkel submissions will also need to be considered.
Motive
156 In Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] 2 WLR 607, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone LC addressed the meaning of the word "motive". His Lordship said (at [73]):
It has been pointed out more than once that "motive" has two distinct but related meanings. I do not claim to say which sense is correct. Both are used, but it is important to realise that they are not the same. In the first sense "motive" means an emotion prompting an act. This is the sense in which I used the term when I said that the admitted motive of the appellant was jealousy of Mrs. Booth. The motive for murder in this sense may be jealousy, fear, hatred, desire for money, perverted lust, or even, as in so-called "mercy killings", compassion or love. In this sense motive is entirely distinct from intention or purpose. It is the emotion which gives rise to the intention and it is the latter and not the former which converts an actus reus into a criminal act. … On the other hand "motive" can mean a "kind of intention" (see Glanville Williams, Criminal Law (The General Part), 2nd ed., p. 48). In this sense, in his direction to the jury, the judge (quoted above, and in the judgment of the Court of Appeal) has said: "It matters not if her motive was to frighten Mrs. Booth." …
It is, however, important to realise that in the second sense too motive, which in that sense is to be equated with the ultimate "end" of a course of action, often described as its "purpose" or "object," although "a kind of intention," is not co-extensive with intention, which embraces, in addition to the end, all the necessary consequences of an action including the means to the end and any consequences intended along with the end.
