Page:Roger Miller Music v. Sony-ATV Publishing (2012).djvu/5

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No. 10-5363

Roger Miller Music, Inc. et al. v.
Sony/ATV Publishing LLC

Page 5

1. The Renewal Copyright

Under the Copyright Act, an artistic work has an original copyright term of twenty-eight years followed by a renewal term of an additional sixty-seven years. 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(B).^[1] A renewal copyright can be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office at any point in the final year of the original term (the “renewal year”), id. § 304(a)(3)(A)(i), or at any time within the renewal term itself, id. § 304(a)(3)(A)(ii); without registration, the copyright renews automatically at the start of the renewal term, id. § 304(a)(3)(B).^[2]

The Copyright Act provides that, if an application to register the renewal copyright is filed within the renewal year, the renewal copyright “shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in any person who is entitled under paragraph (1)(C) to the renewal and extension of the copyright at the time the application is made.” Id. § 304(a)(2)(B)(i). If no application is filed, the renewal copyright “shall vest, upon the beginning of such further term, in any person entitled under paragraph (1)(C), as of the last day of the original term of copyright, to the renewal and extension of the copyright.” Id. § 304(a)(2)(B)(ii).

Paragraph (1)(C) establishes a hierarchy of who is entitled to the renewal copyright:

(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,

(ii) the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author is not living,

↑ The provisions of the Copyright Act discussed herein apply to works originally copyrighted between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1977, and thus to the 1964 songs at issue in this case. These provisions were enacted as part of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.
↑ Prior to 1992, failure to register a renewal copyright prior to the start of the renewal term resulted in the work's entering the public domain. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (amended 1992) (“[I]n default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years from the date copyright was originally secured.”). Although the 1992 Act provided for automatic renewal, it also contained a variety of incentives for voluntary registration during the renewal year. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-379(I), at 11-14 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 166, 171-74 (“Title I automatically renews all subsisting copyrights but, at the same time, provides a strong inducement to register.”).

[1] The provisions of the Copyright Act discussed herein apply to works originally copyrighted between January 1, 1964 and December 31, 1977, and thus to the 1964 songs at issue in this case. These provisions were enacted as part of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992.

[2] Prior to 1992, failure to register a renewal copyright prior to the start of the renewal term resulted in the work's entering the public domain. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a), 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (amended 1992) (“[I]n default of the registration of such application for renewal and extension, the copyright in any work shall terminate at the expiration of twenty-eight years from the date copyright was originally secured.”). Although the 1992 Act provided for automatic renewal, it also contained a variety of incentives for voluntary registration during the renewal year. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-379(I), at 11-14 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 166, 171-74 (“Title I automatically renews all subsisting copyrights but, at the same time, provides a strong inducement to register.”).

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