to declare great wars, to vote on constitutional amendments, and perhaps to decide great state trials. But the policy of the time was quite different. To be sure, neither the governing class in general, nor the party of Cato, desired to enlarge the powers of the assemblies, but through conservatism, or mismanagement, or a desire for popularity, the nobility readily allowed the plebeian tribunes to bring forward bills, not only on constitutional questions, but concerning nearly all branches of the administration. Thus the tribunes became the chief legislators and the plebeian the chief legislative assembly. Another result was that the better class of citizens, who seem to have attended the meetings somewhat regularly at the beginning of the second century, now began to stay away on account of the insignificance or technical character of the bills and the comparative frequency of the meetings. The city populace therefore predominated more and more.
In one direction the powers of the people were diminished: the popular jurisdiction in cases of extortion was superseded by a special court (pp. 145-146).
The Subserviency of the Assemblies. — While the formal powers of the assemblies remained in a large measure the same, and were perhaps more frequently exercised than before, their independence and actual importance continued to decrease. The assembly of centuries, to be sure, refused at first to pass the declaration of war (lex de bello indicendo) at the beginning of the second Macedonian war, but this is the only instance on record. It was probably during the third period that the people ceased to attend those meetings of the curiate assembly in which the curiate law (lex curiata, p. 11) was passed, and began, as a matter of form, to be represented by thirty lictors, perhaps those of the curies (lictores curiatii, p. 9).
The assemblies were regularly subservient to the nobility.
