and was at his own request allowed twenty-five lieutenants with praetorian powers and insignia (legati pro praetore), five hundred ships, and an army of one hundred and twenty-five thousand men.
The results surpassed even the expectations. Within three months he swept the pirates off the sea and ended the war. He came into conflict with other officials, as might be expected; and civil war was waged on a small scale in Crete, but in the disorganized condition of the Roman state such a trivial unpleasantness was overlooked.
The Manilian Law. — Before it became expedient or necessary for Pompeius to resign this command, an opportunity which he had long desired presented itself. L. Licinius Lucullus, consul in 74, had in the war against Mithridates and Tigranes performed some of the most brilliant exploits in Roman military annals; but through his rashness, the insubordination of his troops, and lack of support from Rome, he finally lost all his conquests. Early in 67, before there was any sufficient reason for the change, Gabinius carried a law ordering the consul Manlius Acilius Glabrio at once to take charge of Bithynia and Pontus as his province; and two of the legions of Lucullus were to be discharged from service. Lucullus could then do nothing, Glabrio was incompetent, and the province of Asia seemed endangered. Thereupon the tribune Gaius Manilius proposed in 66 that, in addition to his present authority, Pompeius should have charge of the three provinces of Asia, Bithynia with Pontus, and Cilicia, that he should be intrusted with the command in the war against Mithridates and Tigranes, and have the power to declare war and to conclude treaties of peace and alliance. Catulus and the strict oligarchs opposed the bill as being incompatible with republican principles. Other eminent men advocated it, — for example, Marcus Cicero, now a popular praetor and the leader of the Roman
