that was acted out at the outbreak of the war, with its clamor about a world of enemies, all threatening the life of Germany, all moved by the one desire to weaken, to humiliate, to subjugate the German people and nation—were all these things such a complete surprise? Did these factors actually call for more judgment, more critical sagacity than they possessed? Nowhere was this less true than of our Party. It had already gone through two great German wars, and in both of them had received memorable lessons.
Even a poorly-informed student of history knows that the war of 1866 against Austria was systematically prepared by Bismarck long before it broke out, and that his policies, from the very beginning, led inevitably to a rupture and to war with Austria. The Crown Prince himself, the later Emperor Frederick, in his memoirs under the date of November 14th of that year, speaks of this purpose of the Chancellor:
"He (Bismarck), when he went into office, was firmly resolved to bring Prussia to a war with Austria, but was very careful not to betray this purpose, either at that time or on any other premature occasion to his Majesty, until the time seemed favorable."
"Compare with this confession," says Auer in his brochure 'Die Sedanfeier und die Sozialdemokratie,' "the proclamation that King William sent out 'to my people.'"
"The Fatherland is in danger! Austria and a large part of Germany have risen in arms against us.
"It is only a few years ago since I, of my own free will, without thinking of former misunderstandings, held out a fraternal hand to Austria in order to save a German nation from foreign domination. But my hopes have been blasted. Austria cannot forget that its lords once ruled Germany; it refuses to see in the younger, more virile Prussia an ally, but persists in regarding it as a dangerous rival. Prussia—so it believes—must be opposed in all its
