without forage, and uneasy respecting the attempts of the enemy upon his flanks, had sent them to a considerable distance up the river” Düna, “with orders to return by the left bank, in order to procure subsistence and to gain intelligence.
“This marshal was afraid of having his right turned by Wittgenstein and his left by Steingell (Steinheil), who was advancing at the head of two divisions of the array of Finland, which had recently arrived at Riga. Saint Cyr had sent a very pressing letter to Macdonald, requesting him to use his efforts to stop the march of these Russians, who would have to pass his army, and to send him a reinforcement of 15,000 men; or if he would not do that, to come himself with succours to that amount, and take the command over him. In the same letter he also submitted to Macdonald all his plans of attack and defence. But Macdonald did not feel himself authorized to operate so important a movement without orders. He distrusted Yorck, whom he perhaps suspected of an intention of letting the Russians get possession of his besieging artillery. His reply was that he must first of all think of defending that, and he remained stationary. In this state of affairs, the Russians became daily more and more emboldened; and finally, on the 17th October, the out posts of St. Cyr were driven into his camp, and Wittengenstein possessed himself of all the outlets of the woods which surround Polotzk. He threatened us with a battle, which he did not believe we would venture to accept * * * *. The night which followed” the desperate engagement at the village of Guravitchne[1] “was perfectly tranquil, even to Saint Cyr. His cavalry brought him wrong intelligence; they assured him that no enemy had passed the Düna, either above or below his position: this was incorrect, as Steingell and 13,000 Russians had crossed the river at Drissa, and gone up on the left bank, with the object of taking the marshal in the rear, and shutting him up in Polotzk, between them, the Düna, and Wittgenstein.
“The morning of the 19th exhibited the latter under arms, and making every disposition for an attack, the signal for which he appeared to be afraid of giving. St. Cyr, however, was not to be deceived by these appearances; he was satisfied that it was not his feeble entrenchments which kept back an enterprising and numerous enemy, but that he was doubtless waiting the effect of some manoeuvre, the signal of some important operation, which could only be effected in his rear.
“In fact, about ten o’clock in the morning, an aide-de-camp came in full gallop from the other side of the river, with the intelligence, that another hostile army, that of Steingell, was marching rapidly along the Lithuanian side of the river, and that it had defeated the French cavalry. He required immediate assistance, without which this fresh army would speed-- ↑ See Gifford’s History of the Wars, Vol. I, p. 798.
