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254

ADMIRALS OF THE BLUE.

deck. She was also present in the skirmish off the Hieres islands, July 13th, in the same year^[1].

In the spring of 1796, the Egmont formed part of a squadron sent to Tunis, under Vice-Admiral Waldegrave, on a particular mission^[2]; and on the night previous to their quitting that place, Captain Sutton headed the boats of the different ships in an attack made upon several French vessels lying in the bay, the result of which was the capture of the Nemesis, a 28-gun ship; the Sardine, a corvette of 22 guns; and two other armed vessels. One of the latter was destroyed, the rest brought off in triumph.

Towards the close of the same year, we find Captain Sutton serving with Commodore Nelson at the evacuation of Corsica, a measure rendered necessary by the recent alliance formed between France and Spain. By the exertions of those

↑ On the morning of the 7th July, 1795, Vice-Admiral Hotham, who had previously despatched Captain Nelson with a small squadron on a particular service, received intelligence that that officer was returning to St. Fiorenzo Bay, pursued by the fleet that had so recently been discomfited, and which it was supposed had retired into Toulon.
Notwithstanding his ships were in the midst of watering and refitting, the British commander was enabled, by the zeal and extraordinary exertions of the officers and men under his command, to get the whole fleet under weigh with the land wind that night; but it was not until the morning of the 13th that he discovered the enemy, then off the Hieres islands, in the vicinity of Toulon. A partial action commenced about noon, and in an hour after 1’Alcide, of 74 guns, one of the ships in the French rear, struck her colours; but the rest of their fleet studiously avoiding a general battle, and aided by a change of wind, had got so far into Frejus bay, whilst the greater part of the British were becalmed in the offing, that it became impossible for any thing further to be effected.

Before the Alcide could be taken possession of, a box of combustibles in her fore-top took fire, and the unhappy crew experienced how far more perilous their inventions were to themselves than to their enemies. So rapid was the conflagration, that the French in their official account say, the hull, the masts, and sails, all seemed to take fire at the same moment; and though the English boats were put out to the assistance of the poor wretches on board, not more than 300 could be saved; 400 lives are supposed to have been lost by this dreadful accident.
The loss sustained by the British in this affair was 10 killed, and 24 wounded. The decided inferiority of the French, who, besides having but seventeen ships to oppose to twenty-one, had but one 3-decker, whereas their opponents had six, is a sufficient excuse for their declining to engage.
↑ See p. 61.

[1] On the morning of the 7th July, 1795, Vice-Admiral Hotham, who had previously despatched Captain Nelson with a small squadron on a particular service, received intelligence that that officer was returning to St. Fiorenzo Bay, pursued by the fleet that had so recently been discomfited, and which it was supposed had retired into Toulon.
Notwithstanding his ships were in the midst of watering and refitting, the British commander was enabled, by the zeal and extraordinary exertions of the officers and men under his command, to get the whole fleet under weigh with the land wind that night; but it was not until the morning of the 13th that he discovered the enemy, then off the Hieres islands, in the vicinity of Toulon. A partial action commenced about noon, and in an hour after 1’Alcide, of 74 guns, one of the ships in the French rear, struck her colours; but the rest of their fleet studiously avoiding a general battle, and aided by a change of wind, had got so far into Frejus bay, whilst the greater part of the British were becalmed in the offing, that it became impossible for any thing further to be effected.

Before the Alcide could be taken possession of, a box of combustibles in her fore-top took fire, and the unhappy crew experienced how far more perilous their inventions were to themselves than to their enemies. So rapid was the conflagration, that the French in their official account say, the hull, the masts, and sails, all seemed to take fire at the same moment; and though the English boats were put out to the assistance of the poor wretches on board, not more than 300 could be saved; 400 lives are supposed to have been lost by this dreadful accident.
The loss sustained by the British in this affair was 10 killed, and 24 wounded. The decided inferiority of the French, who, besides having but seventeen ships to oppose to twenty-one, had but one 3-decker, whereas their opponents had six, is a sufficient excuse for their declining to engage.

[2] See p. 61.

[1]

[2]