to professional knowledge and gallantry which the human mind is perhaps capable of making, could have rendered its event successful. Independent of that superiority which the enemy possessed in respect to numbers, they had the additional advantage of being so near to their own ports, that even in case of discomfiture, they could retire without dreading the consequences of pursuit, and moor in safety under the cannon of their own fortresses, in a less space of time than would be required to refit the rigging of a frigate, after an hour’s contest with a vessel of equal force. The magnitude of the object, a firm reliance on the intrepidity, as well as activity of those whom he commanded, and a proper confidence in his own judgment, contributed to make the British Admiral despise all the surrounding difficulties; and determined him to attempt a new mode of attack, which he had arranged in his mind as practicable, should fortune ever favour him with an opportunity of carrying it into execution. He had long entertained very sanguine hopes it would be crowned with the most brilliant success; and the instant he received the augmentation of force before alluded to, and became apprized of the enemy’s fleet being at sea, he delayed not a moment in making known to those he commanded, his resolution to engage them, and the peculiar manner in which he intended to arrange his attack.
In this situation of affairs, the Spanish Admiral Don Josef de Cordova sailed from Carthagena, Feb. 1st, 1797, with a fleet consisting of twenty-seven sail of the line, twelve frigates, and a brig[1].
- ↑ Spanish Line of Battle.
Van Squadron. Guns. Bahama 74 Pelayo 74 San Pablo 74 Neptuno 80 Concepcion 112 San Domingo 74 Conquistadore 74 San Juan Nepomuceno 74 San Genaro 74 Repeaters. – Brigada, Casilda, Perla, Mercades – Frigates.
