undertakings rendered possible by their possession of that important position.
With these secret instructions, the king sent a sealed letter[1] which Medina Sidonia was to hand to Parma, either after the latter had landed in England, or after he had abandoned all hope of being able to do so. By this missive, Parma was empowered, in case neither England nor Spain should have gained a decisive victory, to treat for peace. The king prescribed three main conditions, viz. (1) Free exercise of the Catholic faith in England, and the repeal of the sentence of exile upon those already expelled from the country on account of holding that faith; (2) Surrender of the places held in the Netherlands by the English, and especially of Flushing; (3) Compensation for the great injuries inflicted on Spanish possessions and subjects. From this it is apparent that some time before the sailing of the Armada, Philip admitted the possibility of the failure, whole or part, of the expedition.
The instructions, secret as well as public, were drawn up on March 22nd. The confusion and ambiguity noted in them may be noted also in the supplementary instructions which were subsequently added to them. The Armada did not leave Corunna until July 12th, so that there was plenty of time for the reconsideration of the plans put forward in March.
On May 18th, Medina Sidonia wrote to the king a letter[2] in which he discussed the project. His views then expressed agree with Philip's instructions, in so far as they indicate that the admiral considered it as settled that he was not to seek the enemy previous to the moment of Parma's junction with him. He does not, however, mention the place of junction. And the letter opens up some entirely new questions. In common with his most experienced officers, Medina Sidonia considered that it would be risky to hand over many of his troops to Parma so long as the enemy's fleet had not been rendered harmless.[3] His idea was rather to unite with Parma, and then to seek and destroy the English fleet, before attempting a landing. If he should succeed in doing this, he would give Parma as many me as the latter might ask for. The land attack would thereby be rendered the more secure and certain. This pre-supposed, of course, a junction between Medina Sidonia and Parma previous to the discovery and disabling of the enemy.
