Breyer, J., dissenting
- Dr. Zivot explained that Bucklew “would likely experience unconsciousness that sets in progressively as the chemical circulates through his system” and that it was during this period that Bucklew was “likely to experience prolonged feelings of suffocation and excruciating pain.” Id., at 233–234.
The State asked the District Court to grant summary judgment in its favor on the theory that Bucklew failed to identify a genuine factual issue regarding whether an execution by lethal injection would be impermissibly painful. The District Court refused. The court believed that Bucklew had adequately shown that for up to several minutes he “could be aware that he is choking or unable to breathe but be unable to ‘adjust’ his breathing to remedy the situation.” Id., at 827. Recognizing that the State’s evidence suggested that Bucklew would experience this choking sensation for a shorter period, the District Court concluded that the dispute between the experts was “a factual dispute that the Court cannot resolve on summary judgment, and would have to be resolved at trial.” Ibid.
The District Court was right. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Bucklew, creates a genuine factual issue as to whether Missouri’s lethal injection protocol would subject him to several minutes of “severe pain and suffering,” Glossip, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 13), during which he would choke and suffocate on his own blood. In my view, executing Bucklew by forcing him to choke on his grossly enlarged uvula and suffocate on his blood would exceed “the limits of civilized standards.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 435 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100–101 (1958) (plurality opinion). The experts dispute whether Bucklew’s execution will prove as unusually painful as he claims, but resolution of that dispute is a matter for trial.
