rehabilitation of the offender. Retaining the death penalty for this purpose is therefore unnecessary. Section 277(1) which authorises the death penalty under these unnecessarily inhuman and degrading circumstances is inconsistent with the right to life and human dignity embodied in Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution, respectively, and is in direct conflict with the values that Section 35 aims to promote in the interpretation of these sections. Taking the life of a person under such deliberate and calculated circumstances, with the methods already described in the judgement of Chaskalson P, is cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It is inconsistent with Section 11(2) of the Constitution. In my view, therefore, the death penalty is unconstitutional. Not only does it violate the right not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, it also violates the right to life and human dignity.
[318]O'Regan J: I have read the judgment of Chaskalson P and I agree with the order that he proposes. However, although I agree that the death sentence constitutes a breach of section 11(2) of the Constitution that is not justified in terms of section 33, it is my view that it also constitutes a breach of section 9 (the right to life) and section 10 (the right to dignity) for the reasons that are given in this judgment.
[319]The crimes of which the two prisoners whose case has been referred to this court have been convicted were committed during a robbery from a bank security vehicle which was delivering monthly wages to the Coronation Hospital in Johannesburg. It appears from the judgment of the Appellate Division that the two prisoners were part of a group of robbers who had cold-bloodedly planned the robbery. All the robbers had been armed with AK47s and had opened fire on the security vehicle and the accompanying vehicle when they had driven into the hospital parking area. As a result of the shooting, two policemen and two bank security officials were shot dead.
[320]There is no doubt that the crimes committed by the two prisoners were abhorrent. Our society cannot and does not condone brutal murder or robbery. Perpetrators of crimes such as these must be punished severely according to our system of criminal justice. In this case, the prisoners have been tried, convicted and sentenced. The question that this court must answer is not whether the prisoners committed these crimes, nor whether they should be punished. It has been established by the proper courts that they did commit crimes, and for that they must be punished. What this court must consider is whether the form of punishment that has been imposed is constitutional. Does our constitution permit any convicted criminal, however heinous the crime, to be put to death by the government as punishment for that crime?
[321]The Constitution entrenches certain fundamental rights. Included amongst these are the right to life (section 9), the right to the respect for and protection of dignity (section 10) and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment (section 11(2)). The prisoners allege that the death penalty is in conflict with each of these. The language of each of these rights is broad and capable of different interpretations. How is this court to determine the content and scope of these rights? This question is at least partially answered by section 35(1) of the constitution which enjoins this court in interpreting the rights contained in the Constitution to 'promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality'.
