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rights to ensure that they are available to all. In the process, it sets the State up as a model for society as it endeavours to move away from a violent past. It is therefore reasonable to expect that the State must be foremost in upholding those values which are the guiding light of civilised societies. Respect for human dignity is one such value; acknowledging it includes an acceptance by society that "… even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity."[1]

[78] The State sought to strengthen its argument by pointing out the comparative convenience of juvenile whipping as a punishment: it satisfied criteria for punishment, while at the same time affording the courts a reasonable sentencing option; it was not too harsh for young offenders, but it enabled them to "get it over and done with" quickly. In this context, we were informed that parents often asked for this punishment to be imposed.

[79] While there are obvious advantages to "quick" justice, society's greater concern must be the form such punishment takes. The solutions we adopt in dealing with young offenders have to be part of a greater context and must be consistent with the promotion of the values which are reflected in the Constitution. It cannot be reasonable and in keeping with these values to imply, through the punishments we impose, that the infliction of violence is an acceptable option in the solution of problems. In any event, this consideration falls far short of the justification required to entitle the State to override the prohibition against the infliction of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment. Its implications for the dignity of the individual are also far too serious.

[80] The State stressed the deterrent nature of juvenile whipping. Deterrence is, obviously, a legitimate objective which the State may pursue. We live in a crime-ridden society; the courts and other relevant organs of the State have a duty to make crime unattractive to those who are inclined to embark on that course. The concerns which the provision seeks to address are indeed pressing and they are substantial. But, as already stated, the means employed must be reasonable and demonstrably justifiable. No clear evidence has been


  1. Brennan J in Furman v Georgia supra note 36, at 273.