Dutch colonists, and it was mainly on this account that I ventured to publish my pamphlet and other articles.
I am quite aware that this is hardly the place to enter into any full details concerning the Zulu war, of which the general history is universally known, but I cannot forbear making one or two observations.
The disaster that befell the British force at the commencement of the campaign was, I think, to be attributed first, to the mistake of supposing that the Zulu method of attack would be the same as that of the Kaffirs; secondly, to the circumstance that the numbers of the Zulu warriors had been so much underrated that an insufficient English force was brought into the field against them; not that Sir Bartle Frere was in any way responsible for this, as he had already asked for reinforcements; and thirdly, that there had not been diligence enough exercised in reconnoitring the country. But if the defeat brought its indignity, it was soon obliterated by the victory that ensued, when general, officers, and men, regained their laurels in contending with the most martial of African people upon the most unfavourable of soils. It was the victory of Ulundi, not any achievements of Sir Garnet Wolseley, that was the crowning-point of the campaign, and I cannot but consider that it was premature on the part of the English Government to supersede Sir Bartle Frere, and to recall Lord Chelmsford, before the war was actually at an end. The consequence has been that the treaty made with the Zulus has not been of a character to ensure a permanent peace with the native element in South Africa.
