One of their first operations in Ukraine was the disarming of Crimea in 2014. They were also involved in the downing of the Ukrainian MOD IL-76 (resulting in 49 dead) and attacks on Luhansk airport and Debaltseve.[1]
8. The Wagner Network then significantly expanded its military and non-military operations in many countries: a trend described by Transparency International as “increasingly alarming”.[2] These interventions were often secretive[3] and met with denials from host governments,[4] the Russian government[5] and Prigozhin himself.[6] A former Wagner fighter told us that the Russian Government gave extensive military support to the Wagner Network from the time of its creation:
All that is necessary for combat- uniforms, equipment, weapons and ammunition, was received from Ministry of Defence stocks.[7]
Even the standard issued weapon of Wagner fighters, a 5.45mm machine gun, relied on the supply of ammunition by the Russian state.[8] The former Wagner fighter’s evidence—prepared in the first half of 2023—also noted the network’s continued use of the logistics of the Russian Ministry of Defence at that time. The fighter stated that the Ministry provides ammunition and weapons, and facilitates the transfer of Wagner operatives to Syria and Africa. There were also additional forms of support:
Military transport aircraft of the Russian Armed Forces deliver mercenaries and small dimension/weight cargo to the Khmeimim air base (Syria) and further to Africa. Air bases in the city of Chkalovsk (Moscow Region) and Krymsk (Krasnodar Territory) are used to transport operatives of PMC Wagner. Heavy duty cargo, equipment and ammunition for PMC Wagner are delivered to Syria by the Russian Navy.[9]
- ↑ “Utkin and Wagner might also have been involved in the assassination of at least 10 Luhansk People’s Republic warlords.” Dossier Center (WGN0009) paras 22–23.
- ↑ Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 5.1
- ↑ Q39 [Dr Sorcha MacLeod]. Occasionally, Wagner deployments are referred to as visiting ‘Russian instructors’. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 1
- ↑ For example, Sudan’s foreign ministry denies presence of Russian Wagner Group, Reuters, 22 March 2022; Mali denies deployment of Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group, France 24, 25 December 2021. In conversations, ministers and officials in one country where we are confident Wagner fighters have been deployed were extremely cagey when we asked them whether they invited Wagner to operate in the country
- ↑ For example, see Sergei Lavrov quote in ‘Russian mercenaries behind Central African Republic atrocities’, BBC News, 3 May 2022; see the Russian delegate’s comments on Mali at ReliefWeb, ‘Amid Executions, Forced Disappearances in Mali, Mission Head Tells Security Council Little Progress Made towards Implementing Peace Agreement’, 7 April 2022 (accessed 10 July 2023)
- ↑ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Putin’s Not-So-Secret Mercenaries: Patronage, Geopolitics, and the Wagner Group’, 8 July 2019 (accessed 16 July 2023); Leaked documents reveal Russian effort to exert influence in Africa | World news, The Guardian, 8 June 2019
- ↑ Anonymous (WGN0026)
- ↑ The fighter added: “In the Middle East and Africa, the standard for the army is a 7.62 mm assault rifle and these countries do not produce/have ammunition for a 5.45 mm rifle.” Anonymous (WGN0026)
- ↑ Anonymous (WGN0026)
