The details of this new approach are not yet clear. Some aspects of the UK response are unlikely to be public, for example, activity to counter malign Russian disinformation.[1]
A focus on Ukraine, not Africa
35. Given that Ukraine is “front and centre”, we asked the Department at what point the network’s activities in other countries should become a point of interest for the UK Government, given the negative effects of its presence and the likely use of resources from African operations to fund Russia’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine. The FCDO did not directly answer. Instead, it re-emphasised the use of sanctions and noted:
We are stepping up what we are doing inside Government on this. We have, frankly, much more activity inside Government aimed at understanding Wagner and trying to take steps against it than we did six months ago.[2]
36. Mikhail Khodorkovsky—a Russian dissident, former senior businessman, and the founder of the Dossier Center—suggested that the UK and its allies under-estimated the significance of the network’s activities in Africa.[3] In some cases, it is not clear that the disruptive and destabilising influence of the Wagner Network has informed important decisions over the UK’s policy towards specific countries and regions:
• In March 2021, wider aid cuts led to the premature ending of a £2.6 million UK-funded programme designed to foster stability in Sudan,[4] a country where the Wagner Network had been involved since 2017. We disagree with the Foreign Secretary that there is no connection between ODA expenditure and the conflict in Sudan.202[5]
• In late 2022, the UK, along with many other countries,[6] announced that it would withdraw its peacekeeping forces from Mali, ending involvement earlier than expected. Wagner involvement appears to have contributed to this decision.[7] It is not clear what efforts the UK made to encourage the Malian authorities to allow the UN Mission to operate freely. The decision to withdraw was taken collectively via the National Security Council, via a “write-round process initiated by the Defence Secretary”. We do not know whether FCDO officials raised alternatives to withdrawal for discussion with the Ministry of Defence.[8]
- ↑ “The National Security Bill will create a more challenging operating environment for states and other actors who seek to undermine UK interests, and we will make use of the full range of powers available to us – including considering proscription – to tackle the threats we face from organisations such as Wagner. We will also continue to develop our broader deterrence and defence toolkit, including information operations and offensive cyber tools, and make greater use of open source information alongside our intelligence capabilities.” HM Government, Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a more contested and volatile world, CP 811, March 2023, para 19(iv)
- ↑ Q199 [Ben Fender]
- ↑ Q107 [Mikhail Khodorkovsky]
- ↑ The figures in the text specifically refer to CSSF funding. UK agrees to review if aid cuts left it ‘off guard’ in Sudan, Devex, 1 June 202
- ↑ Oral evidence taken on 12 June 2023, HC (2022–23) 171, Q529 [James Cleverly]
- ↑ For example, France, Sweden, Germany. See UN ends peacekeeping force in Mali, Research Briefing 9827, House of Commons Library, 3 July 2023, p 9
- ↑ UK Government, ‘Minister for the Armed Forces statement on the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Mali’ 14 November 2022 (accessed 17 July 2023)
- ↑ Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
