Russia which continue to have close and intimate relationships with Russian officials300[1] We recommend that the UK Government takes advantage of the current uncertainty and seeks to disrupt the Wagner Network. In particular, at a moment when its usual supply channels from the Russian Ministry of Defence are in doubt, the Government should do all within its power to restrict the flow of arms and other military equipment to the Wagner Network, to reduce the viability of future combat operations. The UK Government should also share intelligence with host Governments to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Wagner Network and to demonstrate how it is a tool of enrichment for the Russian state.
What next for ‘PMCs’?
75. Our report focused on the Wagner Network as an obvious example of a ‘PMC’—also often called PMSC301[2]—that poses a threat to the UK’s interests and values. We acknowledge that many dispute the applicability of this term. It is not the only Russia-aligned PMC,302[3] even if it is unique.303[4]Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, warned of an “extremely concerning” increase in the use of ‘PMCs’ as proxies by Russia and others.304[5] Some drew attention to the significant growth of China’s private sector industry in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative,305[6] and warned that countries may consider using proxies in future in a similar way to Russia, as we have seen in Iran.306[7] As we watch the fallout of the Wagner Network and where it continues to have influence, we should be particularly looking at Syria and whether Iran
- ↑ The Foreign Office listed Russia-linked PMCs as: RSB Group, Redut, Moran Security Group, ENOT Corp, Vegacy Strategic Services and PMC MAR. There is also the PMC ‘Patriot Group’, which the U.S. State Department has said is run by the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu. A former Wagner fighter described the other PMC, Redut, in this way: “Redut was created to protect the factories transferred to the management of […] Timchenko (a Russian oligarch and former KGB officer close to Putin)’s structures. The godfather for this project, Timchenko, was proposed by the Russian military. The head of the Redut, K. Merzoyants, has maintained close friendly relations with some high-ranking officers of the Russian General Staff. […] Redut receives weapons, military equipment and ammunition from the stocks of the Russian forces in Syria.” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025); Anonymous (WGN0026); Russia’s private armies, POLITICO, 28 June 2023
- ↑ Private Military and Security Company. This term is not clearly defined in international law. It has been used in a general sense in this report to cover a company that sells military and/or security services for compensation.
- ↑ As mentioned in a previous footnote, other PMCs include: RSB Group, Redut, Moran Security Group, ENOT Corp, Vegacy Strategic Services and PMC MAR. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025).
- ↑ FCDO sees it as “highly likely” that “none are as close to the state as Wagner”. There is fluidity between the members of various PMCs. Grozev noted: “We see that these different incarnations of private military companies in Russia are fluid—they flow from one another—simply because they are not companies, they are proxies for the state.” Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025; Q64. See also Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 46–52
- ↑ “We are seeing increasing use of them. We are seeing them being used not just by Russia but also by other countries, and it is extremely concerning to the working group that that trend is emerging. We published a report in 2020 that was submitted to the UN General Assembly. We highlighted the new manifestations, the proxy actors and a lot of the points that I made earlier. From our perspective, the biggest concern is the insertion and deployment of these types of actors into armed conflicts where they do not help the situation.” Q18. Similar point in Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 15.
- ↑ Companies mentioned included China Security & Protection, the Shandong Huawei Security Group and Genghis Security Services, HuaXin Zhong, Beijing DeWe Security Services Limited Company, Frontier Services Group and China Overseas Security Group. See Transparency International Defence & Security, Transparency International UK (WGN0021) para 5.3; Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 16; CSIS, ‘A Stealth Industry: The Quiet Expansion of Chinese Private Security Companies’, 12 January 2022 (accessed 16 July 2023)
- ↑ PMCs are currently banned in China. Private Security Companies (PSCs) are permitted, but they are officially banned from carrying weapons abroad: a significant difference to Russia. Prof. Mark Galeotti (Managing Director at Mayak Intelligence Ltd) (WGN0005) para 16
